It is absurd that Ethiopia’s (and Africa’s) agricultural standards are being set in Brussels with no African farmers present. Ethiopia faces the risk of losing a significant amount of its export revenue if it fails to comply with these regulations.
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The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), coming into force in late 2025, requires that commodities, including coffee, cocoa, cattle, palm oil, rubber, and soy, imported into the EU be deforestation-free. Producers must also demonstrate full traceability, including the geo-coordinates of the plots, and compliance with all relevant local laws. In the case of Ethiopia, the EUDR bans the sale of coffee if companies cannot prove that it did not come from deforested land. Operators (exporters, importers) risk fines, blocked shipments, or losing market access if they cannot demonstrate compliance.
The regulation was introduced to curb rapid deforestation in developing countries. In many regions, poor farming practices exhaust the soil, forcing farmers to clear new land and accelerate forest loss. Environmentalists have welcomed the EUDR, and on the surface, its objectives seem to show genuine concern for the planet. Look closer, however, and the policy begins to resemble a power move that is insensitive to the conditions Ethiopian farmers are facing.
It’s understandable to find it absurd that Ethiopia’s (and Africa’s) agricultural standards are being set in Brussels with no African farmers present. Ethiopia faces the risk of losing a significant amount of its export revenue if it fails to comply with these regulations.
How Ethiopia is Structured
Coffee brings in roughly one-third of Ethiopia’s export earnings. And the European Union (EU) is the largest buyer. Most Ethiopian coffee is grown by smallholders on tiny plots (often less than two hectares), often in forested or semi-forested highland regions under shade, with limited infrastructure. Challenges include weak land registries, limited access to reliable internet, low availability of digital traceability tools, and thin institutional capacity in remote areas. Its within this context that the EUDR must be considered, which leads us to the next question.
Is it fair?
First, Europe’s standards are abrupt and disconnected from Ethiopia’s realities. Most farmers lack the means to prove compliance, and the required data collection and paperwork are both expensive. Instead of being supported, farmers are expected to shoulder these costs themselves. This obviously strains their income. When compliance becomes costly, only better-off producers or exporters may succeed. Smallholders risk being excluded or forced to sell into lower-margin, less regulated markets. Some might abandon traditional sustainable systems in favour of more intensive practices that meet arbitrary definitions of “deforestation-free”.
Secondly, Ethiopia’s coffee producers, for the most part, are sustainable farmers. Ethiopia’s coffee cultivation depends on preserving forests and the shade they cast, which shields the plants from excessive heat. The crop is tended by smallholder farmers, most of whom work plots of less than two hectares. These are far more sustainable practices than the vast monoculture coffee plantations we see in countries like Brazil.
So, these regulations shift the cost of verifying, documenting, and proving compliance onto exporting countries, many of which did little or no harm in the first place. And the Ethiopian farmers, who already follow sustainable practices, must still prove their credentials to satisfy European law.
Holding Revenue Hostage
Ethiopia depends heavily on exports, and coffee is among the most important. When a large share of its export markets demand that Ethiopia change its practices or provide expensive documentation, export income becomes conditional. If EU buyers abandon Ethiopian coffee because of non-compliance, that revenue evaporates.
Because Europe sets the standard unilaterally, Ethiopia has limited ability to negotiate the terms; it must adapt or be shut out. That gives European markets leverage over Ethiopia’s economy. It is, in effect, an economic shaming or conditionality: conform to the EU’s definition of sustainability or lose access. That condition is powerful because Ethiopia cannot easily replace the EU as a buyer nor absorb the losses without serious harm.
For trade to support climate goals without inflicting economic harm, regulations must include fairness: tailored implementation, support, and genuine participation by affected countries. Otherwise, the regulations are less about saving forests and more about preserving European security of supply at Ethiopia’s expense.
